firms.
1 As in the rest of the economy, capital investment in retail remains weak relative to the strength in cash flow and valuations. Yet the retail sector has invested heavily in new business practices, such as inventory management and logistics, that have led to enhanced productivity (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2006) . We show that intangible capital, in particular, is associated with this higher productivity, both over time and across subindustries. 1 In our measure of concentration-the sales-weighted average Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of sales across NAICS three-digit sectors, as in Gutierrez and Philippon (2017b)-the remaining increase in concentration is largely accounted for by the oil and gas sectors. The online Appendix has detail on the oil and gas sector.
Figure 1. Concentration among Publicly Traded US Firms
Notes: The figure reports the average HHI of sales across NAICS three-digit sectors, weighted by their respective share of total sales. The data is from the Compustat-CRSP merged database; see the online Appendix for details on the sample construction. The retail sector are firms belonging to retail group in the Fama-French 49 (FF-49) industrial classification; oil and gas are firms belonging to the FF-49 petroleum and natural gas group. 
I. Concentration, Productivity, and Markups in the Retail Sector
The retail sector is a key contributor to the well-documented increase in economy-wide concentration in the United States (Autor et al. 2017) . From 1995 to 2015, the HHI of public firms' sales in the Fama-French retail sector rose from 0.13 to 0.36, as shown by the solid lines in each panel of Figure 2 .
2 In the online Appendix we document that this phenomenon is not driven by a particular subsector, but instead occurs across most NAICS three-digit subsectors within retail. For instance, the sales HHI for General Merchandise retailers ( big-box stores, such as Walmart) doubled over these two decades, and tripled for non-store retailers (online stores, such as Amazon).
Two broad interpretations for the economy-wide rise in concentration have been put forward. One focuses on market power: higher concentration could reflect a decline in competitiveness within US industries (Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017a; De Loecker and Eeckhout 2 The Fama-French retail sector is primarily comprised of firms in the NAICS 2-digit sectors 44 and 45. These 2-digit subsectors accounted for over 99.9 percent of total sales in the Fama-French retail sector in 2010. In that year, the Fama-French retail sector accounted for 18.4 percent of total sales of US public firms, the single largest contributor to total sales in the Fama-French 49 industrial classification. 2017). The other interpretation focuses on productivity. Differences in productivity between firms may lead to a reallocation of demand toward the highest-productivity firms as goods become more substitutable (Autor et al. 2017) . Alternatively, rising productivity differences within industries could also lead to higher concentration.
The former hypothesis suggests that the rise in concentration is worrisome, as it may be associated with higher markups and lead to low investment. The latter hypothesis, by contrast, suggests that concentration may be the efficient byproduct of underlying technological changes. The tension between market power and efficiency is particularly relevant to the retail sector, which sets prices for a large number of consumer goods, and has also undergone substantial technological and organizational changes over the period (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2006) .
The top row of Figure 2 reports trends in two measures of productivity among publicly traded firms in the retail sector, over the period coincident with the rise in concentration. Panel A shows the average increase in revenue per employee, a proxy for labor productivity, across subsectors in retail. The average ratio is first computed within subsectors (weighting by firms' sales), and then averaged across subsectors (weighting by the subsector's share of total retail sales). Expressed in 1990 prices, this ratio rose from approximately $120,000 to $200,000 per employee, a two-thirds increase over the period. Moreover, this increase persists through the Great Recession.
3 Concurrently, sector-wide measures of overall productivity 3 Since Compustat includes only publicly-traded firms, sample selection into Compustat could overstate these productivity gains. This would occur if both public firms are on average more productive than private firms, and large private firms account for a large share of total sales in the sector. While public firms could plausibly be more productive than private, private retail firms do not seem to account for a large portion of overall sales in the sector. The Quarterly Financial Report, which provides sales figures for all firms with more than $50m in assets (including private ones), indicates that total sales for all firms in that group was $1.53 trillion in 2003, compared to $1.25 trillion (82 percent) for the equivalent Compustat firms. The largest of the private firms is the fourteenth largest firm in retail, with sales equal to 5.7 percent of the largest (public) firm. Note that Compustat sales also include international revenue, but this is likely a small fraction of the total in retail.
(reported in panel B) also rose by almost half over the same period. These increases in productivity closely track the increase in concentration: the simple correlation between multi-factor productivity, and the average HHI of sales (the two lines of panel B) is 0.89; the correlation between average revenue per employee and the average HHI of sales is 0.97 (panel A).
While these efficiency measures increase along with concentration, average retail markups at publicly traded firms-measured, in panel C of Figure 2 , as the ratio of sales to cost of goods sold, following the work of De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017)-by contrast, show no upward trend. This measure of markups has been fairly stable since the early 1990s, despite the more than two-fold increase in sales concentration. As shown in the online Appendix, markups at the largest retail firms have, if anything, been somewhat declining since the late 1990s, increasingly so in subsectors such as online retailers. 
II. Efficiency and the Investment Gap
The increase in measured productivity is the consequence, at least in part, of important logistical and organizational changes at large retail chains. For example, as panel D of Figure 2 indicates, inventory needs (measured as the ratio of balance sheet inventory to monthly sales) dropped substantially in the early part of the sample, from approximately 1.8 to 1.3 months, and stabilized since. During this period, the distribution of goods in the retail sector also evolved in several waves, starting with the rise of big-box stores (Walmart), followed by online retailing and marketplaces (Amazon).
While the evidence for productivity improvements appears compelling, and could account for the increase in concentration, the question remains: if productivity rose in retail, why has capital investment been so sluggish? As recently pointed out by Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017b) and Alexander and Eberly (forthcoming), the economy-wide investment rate has been low, both relative to historical levels and relative to measures of investment fundamentals, such as cash flow and Tobin's Q. Figure 3 shows that the retail sector is characterized by the same phenomenon of sluggish investment. The figure reports the time effects in the regression:
where i is a firm, t is a year, y i, t is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets, and X i, t is a vector that contains the ratio of cash flow to assets and a measure of Tobin's Q, both lagged one year. The time effects are a measure of the shortfall of investment, relative to the level implied by Q and cash flows (and firm fixed effects). Roughly at around the time that concentration starts rising, around 1995, the shortfall in investment increases. By the end of the sample, it amounts to a cumulative 10 percentage point gap, relative to the levels of the early 1990s. If, as the behavior of markups suggests, this investment gap is not due to a "wedge" between marginal and average (Tobin's) Q induced by rising market power, what other mechanisms could account for it?
III. Intangibles and Efficiency
While physical capital investment remained sluggish as productivity rose, intangible capital rose markedly. Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the increase in revenue per employee occurred in lockstep with a large increase in the share of intangible to total assets at retail firms. Here, the share of intangible assets is computed using intangibles reported on balance sheet by firms, averaged across firms in the retail sector. Intangibles went from 5 percent to 18 percent of total assets of the sector.
Panel B of Figure 4 repeats the exercise within retail subsectors. An observation is a NAICS three-digit subsector/year. For each observation, both the ratio of revenue per employee, and the intangible share are a sales-weighted average across firms in that NAICS three-digit subsector/year. The simple correlation between the log of these two ratios is 0.49; a simple OLS regression with industry-clustered standard errors indicates that this correlation is significant even within subsectors in retail. 4 As an accounting measure, balance sheet intangibles reflect acquisition activity, 4 The online Appendix reports the share of capitalized R&D and SG&A expenditures in total assets, as constructed by Peters and Taylor (2017) , as an alternative measure of intangible assets. The former measure shows a sharp increase over the sample period. The latter is declining, which may reflect the lower labor share among large firms, as some firms in retail allocate their wage expenses, for accounting purposes, to SG&A, instead of cost of sales. specifically the portion of acquisition expenditures not accounted for by the book value of assets of acquisition targets. The rise in the share of intangibles, as a fraction of total assets, thus indicates that acquisitions during this period increasingly involved the recognition of intangible assets of target firms. In the online Appendix, we show that if firms in retail had kept paying the same multiple of book value for their targets as they did in the 1990-1995 period, the implied increase in the intangible share would have been 2 percentage points, rather than the 13 actually observed. Thus, over the 1995-2015 period, balance sheet intangible capital in the sector rose as acquisitions increasingly involved the recognition of intangible assets of existing firms. Figure 4 indicates a strong correlation between the importance of intangible capital, and the rise in productivity. However, this is not evidence of causality running from intangible investment to higher productivity. In fact, the correlation of Figure 4 may be best interpreted as resulting from an omitted variable. The nature of this omitted variable is at the root of the question. Investment in new designs of supply and distribution networks might, as argued in the previous section, have led to productivity gains. The full value of these innovations may not be reflected in book capital assets, and instead only manifest in acquisition prices. Similarly, brand value may have become an increasingly important asset of retail firms. Brands are costly to develop, and for accounting purposes, their value is only recognized upon acquisition by another firm. Both are examples of an omitted variable potentially driving a link between intangibles and efficiency. In both cases, much as certain technologies are embodied in physical assets-such as computing technology embedded in machine tools-an underlying innovation (a brand, a distribution method) may be embedded in the creation of intangible capital.
The growing role of intangible capital helps shed light on the weakness of physical investment. Increases in intangible capital may not be associated with commensurate increases in physical capital, especially if some intangibles act as substitutes for traditional capital. innovations in logistics displace the more burdensome creation of a retail store, complete with cashiers, floor space and warehousing facilities.) In fact, aggregating intangible investmentmeasured as the sum of acquisitions, and R&D and advertising expenditures-together with traditional capital expenditures, the estimated investment gap reported in Figure 3 declines from 10.0 percentage points to 2.7. 5 More than a straightforward measurement problem, this view sees intangibles as a "missing factor" of production and revenue, measured only intermittently, but whose growing importance may be central to productivity and the rise in concentration.
IV. Conclusion
In some key respects, the experience of the retail sector since the mid-1990s mirrors that of the economy as a whole: traditional investment has been weak relative to valuations, and concentration has been rising. In retail, these trends have been accompanied by a rise in productivity, as the sector adopted technology-driven improvements in business practices. This rise in productivity coincided with the rise in concentration, demonstrating how concentration may be a byproduct of efficiency gains among industry leaders. Moreover, both over time, and across subgroups of the sector, higher productivity is associated with a growing importance of intangible capital. As other sectors and the macroeconomy exhibit related (but not identical) dynamics, future research will explore the role of intangibles in embodying improved business practices and their potential role more broadly.
